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THE LOCAL STRUCTURE OF MILK PRICES
IN NEW HAMPSHIRE MARKETS^
By ALAN MACLEOD
The marketing of milk in the United States, once involving only a
simple exchange between producer and ultimate consumer, has become
progressively more intricate and complex, until today it represents one
of the most complicated processes of assembHng, distributing, and pricing
undergone by any agricultural commodity.
As milk is produced more widely than any other agricultural prod-
uct and is regarded as a food essential to proper nutrition, the way in
which it is marketed affects almost everyone. Inefficiencies, either in the
physical process of marketing or in the pricing of the milk at the various
stages of its distribution, increase marketing costs and hence must either
increase the cost of milk to the consumer or reduce the price received by
the producer, or both.
These inefficiencies may be of two kinds: (1) physical inefficiencies
in the use of equipment, personnel, etc., and (2) pricing inefficiencies
which prevent smooth and rapid functioning of price-making forces in
the market.
Within the past decade there has been a tremendous increase in regu-
lative activity affecting milk marketing. For many years, agencies con-
cerned with the quality and healthfulness of milk produced and sold have
exercised authority over conditions of production and sale, but only
recently has milk received the attention of regulative bodies primarily
interested in controlling prices and conditions of sale. In New England
there are now milk-control agencies in each of the six states and in addi-
tion the Federal Government has issued orders in Boston and several
secondary markets.
These agencies endeavor to set and enforce milk prices. A good deal
of variation exists in the methods used and in the extent to which prices
are controlled. Federal control, for instance, limits attention to the prices
which distributors pay for milk and the allowances which are made for
performing the various services necessary to assemble milk from the farm
to the city plant. State control agencies have followed the practice of
setting resale prices as well as producer prices. There is now no market
of any size in New England in which both the producer and resale prices
are not administratively determined.
Another development which has affected the marketing of milk has
been the increased concentration of distributive business in the hands of
large organizations. In most major milk markets, one or two concerns
now handle a large share of distribution. This concentration of power
has also progressed far in the case of producers, who in many markets
have formed powerful cooperative associations for marketing their milk.
^ This is a New Hampshire publication in the New England-wide milk marketing study, which is
sponsored by the New England Research Council. Acknowledgment is made to Mary L. Geraghty
for assistance with tabulations and to the New Hampshire Milk Control Board, the New Hampshire
State Department of Agriculture, representatives both of cooperative associations and proprietary
companies, and farmers who supplied information for this study.
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Consequently, freely competitive conditions (in the economic sense) are
rarely found. Instead, varying degrees of monopoly are the rule. Numbers
of buyers and sellers are not "large". Recognition is given to the reaction
of competitors. Products are differentiated.
Not only then is it necessary to reckon with a system in which mon-
opolistic elements are important, but also with a system in which prices
at all stages of the marketing process are determined by administrative
action. Thus the possibility, postulated by classical economists, that eco-
nomic forces would, if left alone, work in the direction of the maximum
efficiency of production and distribution is no longer present in most
milk markets.
With this divergence of conditions from those of perfect competi-
tion, and with the presence of administrative price making bodies, most
milk markets are left without any automatic mechanism to bring prices
and charges into proper alignment with conditions of consumption, pro
duction, and distribution.
Administrative agencies, if they are to introduce improved methods
and remove inefficiencies in the distribution of milk, must have criteria
to guide them in the determination of prices and allowances. The need
for these arises from the influences which such prices and allowances as
are set, have upon the amount of milk produced, M'here it is produced, the
\\ hole process of its assembly and distribution, and finally, its consump-
tion. Indeed, in the absence of regulation or ownership of production
and distribution, prices are the mechanism by which the whole produc-
tive and distributive picture is determined. Because of this prime import-
ance of prices and allowances, the powers which a control agency assumes
when it undertakes to set them, are extremely broad and far-reaching.
Without a knowledge of the efi^ects of various price policies, only
by accident will those prices be set which are in the public interest, or in
the interests of the industry itself, (which two may or may not coincide).
They may, if not actually leading to greater inefficiency, at least perpetu-
ate present inefficiencies and discourage the introduction of new and im-
proved methods. Present conditions are not a sound basis on which to
build; they may be far from those which perfect competition would
bring about.
It is here that the research worker can make an important contribu-
tion. All agencies concerned with the determination of prices and allow-
ances, can function intelligently only wdien they understand the manner
in which economic factors operate in the market. The research worker,
by supplying this information, even for only a part of the marketing
process, is rendering a service. Only through the understanding and use
of such information can administered prices be set at levels which will
encourage adoption of improved methods of production and distribution,
equate consumption \\ith production, and promote stability in the in-
dustry.
INTRODUCTION
This study of milk prices, together with the three studies of New
Hampshire milk markets which preceded it, undertakes to supply infor-
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niation of value to those concerned with the determination of milk prices
and allowances. It attempts to provide a better basis than now exists for
making decisions on price policy in New Hampshire milk markets.
After sketching briefly the historical background of milk prices in
New Hampshire, the study shows that, under present conditions, in a
typical market, prices are not derived from any scientific basis and are
certainl)' not those prices which perfectly competitive conditions would
bring about.
Likewise, when markets throughout the state are considered, prices
are found to vary much more ^\idely than any difference in transporta-
tion costs would justify.
The last part of the study investigates the market response of pro-
ducers in two areas, to varymg prices for milk. As might be inferred
from earlier findings, the response of producers to large price differen-
tials tended to be either retarded or overshadowed by the action of other
factors.
In the first study of this series^ a description of the characteristics and
relationships of the supply areas furnishing milk, both to New Hampshire
markets and the Boston market, ^^ as given. In this preliminary publica-
tion, price data did not appear. In addition to locating the farms produc-
ing milk for sale and indicating the markets in which that milk was sold,
a description of the total sales in the various markets and the importance
of different types of distributive agencies was given. The extent of the
various milksheds was indicated, and the relationship of one market to
another was presented in both tabular and graphic form. In this first pub-
lication prices were not considered.
The second publication of the series" described the manner in which
milk moves to the market from the areas of supply reported on in the first
publication. This study was limited to a consideration of the trucking of
milk from the farm to the country station or city plant. Particular em-
phasis was laid upon the charges levied upon the milk, as these are com-
monly deducted from the farmer's check. In this study, prices obtained
for milk at the market or paid to the farmer were not considered, and at-
tention was centered solely upon the trucking charges. In addition to
analyzing present rates charged, a theoretical analysis of the process of
rate formation was included and present charges were considered from
that standpoint.
The third publication' also dealt with milk transportation, emphasiz-
ing what might be termed the physical process of assembling milk from
farms to plants, as contrasted to the preceding study which had to do with
charges levied on this milk. Several schemes of reorganization were
worked out for the south central part of the state.
THE PROBLEM
Despite widespread efforts by regulative agencies, cooperatives,
^ MacLeod, Alan, 'The Milksheds of New Hampshire," N. H. Agri. Exp. Sta. Bui. 295, 1937.
"
ISIacLeod, Alan and Geraghty, Mary L., "The Transportation of New Hampshire Milk; I. Analy-
sis of Trucking Charges," N. H. Agri. Exp. Sta. Bui. 307, 1938.
3 MacLeod, Alan, "The Transportation of New Hampshire Milk; II. Reorganization of Truck
Routes," N. H. Agri. Exp. Sta. Bui. 325, June 1940.
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dealers and individual farmers, to influence, or even to set milk prices in
New Hampshire, such efforts have usually rested on very uncertain bases.
To such fundamental questions as: "What is the proper relationship of
producer prices between two markets?", "What will be the effect on pro-
duction of certain price policies?", and "What schedule of prices will
bring stable market conditions?" no precise answers were available. While
this study does not assume to answer all these questions, or even any one
of them completely, it should provide information which will serve as a
much better base than that which has previously been available.
Under the subject of prices, there are a number of distinct sub-divi-
sions. Perhaps the first subject to be investigated is an historical one, the
history of milk prices in New Hampshire. Accordingly, a brief account
of the historical background of present prices is presented in the next
section of this report.
Having sketched the background, the next topic studied is the pres-
ent price structure in the market. By taking prices paid by the various
dealers in New Hampshire and Boston markets and making the appropri-
ate deductions from those prices, we may obtain a cross section of prices
actually received by producers in different parts of New Hampshire.
Such a cross section will indicate the actual producer price at the farm
for milk of 3.7 percent butterfat at a particular point of time and will
show the relationships of markets to one another at that time.
It is realized that such cross section analysis gives little information
on the actual price relationships which have obtained in past periods and
which presumably have influenced production into its present structure.
Such iriformation, however, will be analyzed in another portion of this
price study, in which sample areas where two or more markets compete
for milk have been selected for detailed analysis of the effect of various
producer prices on the market in which that production was sold.
In these sample areas, detailed information for an eight-year period
regarding individual prices received and method of payments form the
basis of the study. A section of this study has to do with producers' re-
sponse to prices in regard to the markets in which milk is sold.
As an indication of the dangers incident to price-fixing where price
data are either lacking or are disregarded, a brief account is given of an
attempt at price fixing in the city of Berlin, New Hampshire, by the first
New Hampshire Milk Control Board.
Finally, conclusions from this study together with those of the three
preceding pubhcations are brought together in a single section. Their
usefulness to those concerned with milk prices is indicated and suggestions
for applying the conclusions are made.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Without a knowledge of the evolution of the supply situation, many
of the present institutions and practices are difficult to understand. Ac-
cordingly, an attempt is now made to give an account of the changing
supply factors in New Hampshire. In this section are presented only the
more important developments and they are handled briefly, with no at-
tempt at detailed or exhaustive treatment. This is not intended to be a
'
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history, but rather is designed to provide background information for
study of present conditions.
Froduction
The number of dairy cows in New Hampshire in 1940 is not greatly
different from that reported in 1867. (Fig. 1, Table I). After increasing
irregularly to a peak in 1904 of 125 thousand, cow numbers then com-
menced to decline until a low point of 75 thousand was reached in 1928.
During the past decade cow numbers have averaged 82 thousand.
Production estimates are much less reliable than are estimates of cow
numbers. Except for census figures there are no continuous series before
1929. Production in recent years is shown in Table II. The census
figures, though erratic, go back to 1889 and are presented in Table III.
Markets
While changes in cow numbers and volume of production have been
Table I. New Hampshire—Number of Milk Cows in Thousands on Farms
January 1, 1867— 1940
Year
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large, they are by no means as striking as the changes which have taken
place in the asseml)lin<^- and marketing" of milk in New Hampshire
within the past 50 years.
Shipments of fluid milk to Boston out of New Hampshire were
recorded in the 1850's and perhaps began even earlier.
"These early shipments were made by peddlers who brought into
the city the milk which they n.'^eded for their retail trade. But as the busi-
ness increased, there happened what has taken place in every other indus-
try
—
specialization. Handling milk at wholesale became a business distinct
from retailing, and the men who brought in railroad milk came in time
to devote the whole of their energy and capital to buying milk of the
farmers, transporting it, and selling it to retailers."
'
Shipment out of New Hampshire to Boston in 1897 was entirely by
rail. Producers sold milk delivered to the car at the railroad station. This
milk was handled almost entirely in wooden stoppered, HjA quart cans.
In 1898, Whitaker indicated the area of New Hampshire out of
which shipments of fluid milk were being made to Boston, as extending
as far north and west as East Lebanon, N. H., Newport, N. H., and Bel-
lows Falls, Vt.
Writing in 1905, seven years later, he" mentioned producers as far
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Fig. 1. Number of milk cows on New Hampshire
farms, january 1, 1867-1940^
1 For data on which this figure is based, see Appendix Table I.
iWhitaker, George M., "The Milk Supply of Boston and other New England Cities," U. S. D. A.
Bur. of Dairy Industry Bui. 20. 1898.
^Whitaker, George M.. "The Milk Supply of Boston, New York, and Philadelphia," U. S. D. A.
Bur. of Animal Industry Bui. 81. 1905.
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Table II. Total Production of Milk on New Hampshire Farm in Millions
OF Pounds ^






Source —- Yearbooks of Agriculture
1 Excluding milk spilled or wasted on farms and milk sucked by calves.
^
Preliminary.
Table III. Milk Production in Million Gallons in New Hampshire, 1889-1934
29
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Fig. 2. Butter and cheese produced in New Hampshire,
/9H0
1849-1937
As described earlier in this section, as production of butter and
cheese was decHning, sales of fluid milk and cream were increasing. Fluid
milk is now by far the most important outlet for New Hampshire milk,
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with large quantities of milk used as fluid cream in flush periods of the
year.
Methods of Payment
All sorts of different bases for payment for milk have been used in
New Hampshire. While much milk has been (and still is) sold on a flat
price basis of so much per quart, regardless of butter-fat content, even-
ness of production, etc., large amounts have changed hands on the basis
of intricate price formulas.
At the time when shipment of fluid milk to Boston began to be of
importance to New Hampshire dairymen, payments were made on the
basis of a theoretical Boston ])rice/ Farm prices were calculated by de-
ducting varying amounts from the Boston price depending on the dis-
tance from Boston of the station to which the milk was delivered. Prices
were adjusted twice a year, April 1 and October 1. (This situation existed
at least during the period of 1874-1897.)
During the twelve years, 1886-97, theoretical Boston prices averaged
32^ cents per 8^ quart can in summer and 36 3/5 cents in winter.
From these prices, deductions depending- on distance were made.
For stations betw^een 17 and 23 miles from Boston 8 cents
23 and 36 9 cents
36 and 56 10 cents
56 and 76 11 cents
and 1 cent more for each additional 20 miles
These prices were agreed upon six months in advance, but the"joker"
seems to have been that the stipulated price was only paid for such milk
as was sold again, plus a small excess (5 per cent). All surplus beyond
this was made into butter on the farmer's account, at a value of the aver-
age of the jobbing price for butter quoted by the Chamber of Com-
merce, the farmer being charged 4 cents per pound for making. In 1896
the butter value of the surplus milk, less the cost of making, was 1 3 cents
per 83^ quart can, or slightly over 71 cents per cwt. In 1897, surplus
averaged 13 1/3 cents per 83^^ quarts.
The amount of surplus was sufficient in May, 1897 to reduce the
composite price by 2.26 cents per 8^ quart can (about 12 cents per cwt.)
By 1905, the method of payment existing in the late 1890's had been
changed.^ Instead of being paid for surplus milk on the basis of its butter
value, a method by which (within certain limits) the buyer agreed to
take all milk at a flat price was put into effect. By this plan the price was
cut 2 cents per 8}4 quart can (about 11 cents per cwt.), the deduction
being termed a "carrying charge." In addition to this "carrying charge"
a type of rating plan was put into effect whereby producers delivering
amounts varying from their ratings by more than one-sixth would re-
ceive a lower price. Ratings were to be based on farmers' predictions of
intended production, adjusted pro rata to the probable demand in the
market.
The diversity of methods of payment for milk had not disappeared
1 Whitaker, George M., "The Milk Supply of Boston and other New England Cities," U. S. D. A.
Bur. of Dairy Industry Bui. 20, 1898.
2 Whitaker, George M., "The Milk Supply of Boston, New York, and Philadelphia," U. S. D. A.
Bur. of Animal Industry Bui. 81, 190S.
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by 1917, for in that year it was stated that "no uniform price basis, upon
which payments for milk and cream are made, is in vogue in New Hamp-
shire."^ A number of different methods of payment then in common use
were outlined, varying all the way from a flat price regardless of quality
to complicated systems of premiums which sometimes included a "good
will" item.
"The history of price plans in the Boston market is particularly in-
teresting, not only because almost every type of price plan has been tried
cut at one time or another, but because they were worked out some years
earlier than in any other market."" This continuous series if changes in
price plans used by the Boston market has continued to the present.
Local markets in New Hampshire have tended to use either a flat
price plan or a method of payment based upon the use of the milk, though
variations of both these methods have been frequent. At the present time,
most of the larger dealers who purchase milk in New Hampshire for sale
either in Boston or in secondary Massachusetts and New Hampshire
markets, buy on a use basis. Ordinarily, each dealer pools his purchases
and pays a uniform price for milk of 3.7 per cent butter-fat to all his
regular producers. Boston dealers are included in a market-wide pool and
all producers shipping to that market receive a uniform price (subject to
location, butter-fat differentials and association dues). Many of the small
New Hampshire dealers, most of whom distribute in local markets,
purchase on a flat price basis of so much per quart.
Prices Received
Average price series are not trustworthy because of the varied meth-
ods of payment used, and in earher years, because of the scarcity of price
quotations. But some indication of price movements is contained in Table
V and figure 3.
This series indicates that following a period of relatively stable prices
in 1910-16, during which about $2 per hundredweight was received for
milk sold at wholesale, a sharp increase occurred until in 1920 a peak of
$3.82 was reached. The next year prices dropped, but not to anywhere
near their pre-war level, fluctuating between $2.55 and $3.05 until 1931
brought a further drop to $2.14. The last ten years have seen prices keep
close to the $2.00 level, or shghtly above pre-war.
PRODUCER PRICE RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN A SINGLE MARKET
In attempting to present milk prices in New Hampshire, even at a
particular point of time, several problems present themselves. First of
all, within a commodity such as milk which is purchased on different
price bases, one is faced with many different choices. If interest is prima-
rily in the operation of distributors, perhaps attention should be focused
upon Class I and Class II prices with less attention paid to composite
prices. Where producer prices are the prime interest there would seem
to be more virtue in dealing with composite or base and surplus prices
than with Class I and Class II prices. Furthermore, as at the present time,
1 Davis, opus cit.
~ Bacon, Lois B., "Institutional Factors Affecting tlie Marketing of Milk in Boston," Thesis pre-
sented to Radcliffe College, 1934.
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Table V. Prices Received by New Hampshire Farmers for Milk, Wholesale
1910 - 1939
Farm Price Relative
Dollars per cwt. Price
(1910-14—100)
Farm Price Relative
Dollars per cwt. Price
(1910-14—100)
1910
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In order that prices in the various markets might be comparable, a
uniform period has been selected in which to make the comparison. This
period is the month of March, 1939. Several factors were responsible
for
selection of this particular time. March is a month neither of scarcity
nor surplus as far as milk production is concerned. It falls
about midway
between the short month of November and the flush month of June. The
second factor influencing the selection of March, 1939, was that this was,
at the time of commencing the collection of price data, the most recent
complete month. Another factor in its favor was that this month was a
relatively settled month as regards most of the milk markets. No very
drastic price changes took place.
Data regarding prices in this month were obtained from several
sources. Among these were the New Hampshire Milk Control Board,
which furnished data for practically all New Hampshire markets; and
the Boston Milk Administrator, who announced for the month of March
the equalization prices at the various stations located
in New Hampshire.
While the prices paid by the Boston market were already announced
in composite form and applied to milk delivered at the country stations,
those obtained for New Hampshire markets were frequently expressed
as Class I and Class II prices from which the composite prices had to be
calculated. Various deductions had to be made before actual farm prices
could be determined.
Most studies on prices of milk have dealt with averages. Such a pro-
cedure may be of great value in discovering trends and relationships, but
it also tends to conceal many significant facts. Throughout this series of
studies an attempt has been made to get behind the averages to the indi-
vidual producer and distributor. This approach brought to hght many
interesting things when applied to the location of milksheds. It showed,
for instance, that instead of having smooth, clearly defined boundaries
producers are intermingled at the edge of two milksheds. An average ex-
pressed in terms of the boundary on a map would therefore not represent
the actual situation at the edge of the milkshed.
The same is true in the case of producer prices and dealer prices,
even in a particular market. By averaging the various producer prices in
an area, many significant relationships between these prices are eliminated.
For instance, two markets may be found to have approximate equal aver-
age prices to producers for milk. If such markets are adjacent, the con-
clusion may be drawn that because they have about the same average
prices, producer prices will be about equal and a relatively stable relation-
ship will exist. Actually, this may not be the case at all. Producers, even
within one of the milksheds, may be receiving radically different prices
and the comparison between the two markets may show striking differ-
ences in price relationships if individual producer prices are considered
rather than average prices.
One of the difficulties in considering individual producer prices is
that of summarizing and generalizing. In this study we have attempted
to overcome such difficulties by the use of price charts.
In figure 4 an attempt has been made to present a typical New
Hampshire market (Nashua) from the standpoint of the prices received
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at the farm by producers. In preparing this chart, producers were ar-
ninged according to the price they received. Adjustments had to be made










Fig. 4. Prices received at the farm by producers supplying Nashua,
New Hampshire, March, 1939^
1. For data on which this figure is based see Appendix Table I.
made in this case was to deduct from the composite price paid at the plant
a transportation or hauling charge equal to that which the same dealer
was charging other producers living in a similar locality. Where such
data were not available, the deduction made was that corresponding to
the average hauling charge paid by other producers in the same part of
the milkshed.
The range in prices received by producers selling in Nashua is sur-
prising, amounting to 62 cents or 26 per cent of the lowest price received.
Nor is this range affected by a few extreme items; nine producers re-
ceived $2.33 per cwt., the low figure, and five producers received $2.95
per cwt., the high extreme, out of a total of 1 1 3 producers included in the
computations. These prices all refer to milk of 3.7 per cent butter-fat
acceptable to the city health authorities. Unless other factors, such as
distance from market, compensate for such price dispersion, considera-
tions of theory would suggest that the market was inherently unstable and
a shifting of producers from dealers paying low prices to those paying
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high prices would occur, such shifting tending to eHminate the wide
differences in prices in the market.
Before investigating the effect of location and the existence of other
factors compensating for price differences, it is unsafe to draw any con-
clusions, but at this point it can be said that the Nashua market is an old,
settled market, in ^^'hich no radical changes or shifts in producer-dealer
relationships have occurred in recent years.
In figure 4 the influence of distance from markets has not been taken
into consideration and therefore variations in prices may be partly ac-
counted for by difference in location of the farm, as well as differences
in the distributor to whom milk was sold and the price paid by that dis-
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MILES FROM MARKET
Fig. S. Producer prices at various distances from Nashua, New
Hampshire, March, 1939
^
1 For data on which this figure is based see Appendix Table II.
1 In a later section of this study a chart will be presented to show the variation in prices received
by individual producers within a particular distance from market. Again, it is evident that not the
average but the dispersion is important in considering prices received for milk by producers.
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tance from market. In this chart, producers' prices within a certain dis-
tance from market have been averaged and the average is presented in
the chart.'
To show that price differences do not arise entirely, or even largely,
from differences in hauhng charges, the latter are also included in the
chart. This is done in such a way that if transportation differences ac-
counted for all the difference in prices between zones, the sum of zone
prices plus transportation charges would be constant for all parts of the
milkshed. A glance at figure 5 shows this is not so. Transportation charges
to this market tend to decrease with distance from market.
Nevertheless, there is a general tendency for prices to decrease as
distance from market increases. This tendency of prices to decrease with
distance does not result from differences in hauHng charges, (which in
this market have the opposite effect) but rather from other differences
which are to some extent even masked or offset by the hauling charge.
In many cases, the reason for this difference is that dealers buying
from nearby producers tend to carry little or no Class II (surplus) milk
and to pay, therefore, on a higher composite basis than those purchasing
from producers living at greater distances from the market. This tenden-
cy may partly be accounted for by the ease with which producers living
close to the market may get into retail distribution should prices received
from dealers not be satisfactory. Those living at greater distances perhaps
have no such alternative and must, therefore, accept a much lower price
before they are forced into either retail distribution or to selling in other
markets located at even greater distances from their farms.
In figure 6 the individual prices received within a given range of
miles from market are presented. This chart indicates that even within a
group of producers located the same distance from market there are sub-
stantial differences in the prices which they received. These differences
are particularly evident when several dealers purchase in the same area,
but are even present when all the producers deliver their milk through
the one dealer. Had more dealers purchased on rating plans the dispersion
of prices within an area probably would have increased.
The data so far presented indicate that rather than being the excep-
tion, variation among producer prices is the rule. Undoubtedly, though
these prices are calculated on 3.7 milk, some of the differences may be
attributable to quality factors, both from a sanitary standpoint and from
a butter-fat content. There is much evidence, however, to prove that
quality factors by no means account for all or even a large portion of the
differences in price. Strength of bargaining power is one factor that may
cause prices to differ. Where producers have access to several different
dealers, they are more likely to obtain a relatively high price than where
a producer has only one possible market outlet. The location of truck
routes has much to do with the bargaining position of a particular pro-
ducer. If located favorably with regard to one or more truck routes, a
producer is in a much more favorable position to bargain for the sale of
his milk than if situated at some distance from a route now operating.
This factor of location is important in explaining why some producers
have much greater bargaining power than others.
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PRICE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN MARKETS
So far, we have considered the price structure of the supply side of






Fig. 6. Individual producer prices received within a given range of
MILES FROM A TYPICAL NeW HAMPSHIRE MARKET, 1939 '
^ For data on which this figure is based, see Appendix Table III.
of prices between different markets. Figure 7 and Table VI show the aver-
age prices paid for milk at delivery points throughout New Hampshire in
1 Swonger, C. W., "A Study of Milk Marketing Conditions in the Boston Milkshed," New England
Milk Producers' Association, 1939,
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March, 1939. These prices are composite prices and are for market milk
of 3.7 per cent butter-fat. They have been weighted by quantities de-
livered (in a few instances, approximations of deliveries have been made
on the basis of quantities sold).
The normal seasonal movement in Boston composite prices is much
greater than that in most secondary New Hampshire markets. Conse-
quenth, the particular period during which the comparison is made may
influence greatly the price relations between various markets. In this con-
nection, however, an index of seasonal variation in the Boston market for
the period 1920-38 has shown the month of Aiarch to represent 98.8 per
cent of the average for the year.' In this computation, A4arch showed less
deviation from the average of the year than any other single month. Thus
while prices for a particular year may vary widely from the seasonal
movement suggested above, it is reasonable to assume that the relationship
Fig. 7. Average prices received by pro-
ducers AT VARIOUS New Hamp-
shire, markets, march, 1939\
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shown in March, 1939, between the Boston market and other markets,
was as typical as if any other recent month had been taken for purposes
of this comparison.
Figure 7 shows that in a "normal month" there exist a number of
different prices and that a range in prices of over 50 per cent is not un-
usual. Had other months besides March been considered, this range would
have been found to have changed—the extent of the change depending
on three factors: (1) the Class I prices in the various markets; (2) the
Class II prices, and (3) the proportion of Class I and Class II milk in the
different markets.
Table VI. Average Prices Paid for Milk at Delivery Points in New Hampshire,
March, 1939
Delivery point^
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Fig. 8. Relative prices paid at the plant for Zl milk sold to three
MARKETS ^
^ For data on which this figure is based, see Appendix Table IV.
and while based on only a cross section analysis, this chart does give some
idea of the magnitude of price differences between delivery points located
at different distances from the primary market.
Prices vary from an average of |2.848 for Nashua, N. H. (in the
southern part of New Hampshire and within 40 miles of Boston) to
$1,780 in Lancaster, in the northern part of the state. This maximum dif-
ference of $1,068 is much greater than can be accounted for by differ-
ences in transportation costs to the Boston market. Taking into account
the location differential of 46 cents per hundredweight which producers
located within 40 miles of Boston receive and the transportation costs, the
difference between prices at Nashua and Lancaster would be only about
60 cents per cwt. (assuming milk at Nashua were shipped by rail).
Whether or not the price structure as shown in figure 7 will be
stable is a question upon which some light is shed in a later part of this
report. The immediate explanation of the price differentials between
markets in the south and north of New Hampshire is that the former are
largely local secondary markets while the latter are delivery points to the
Boston market. Whether because of provisions in the Federal Order for
the Boston market or for other reasons," in the past few years the Boston
market has carried a very much greater proportion of Class TI milk, than
have secondary New Hampshire markets. This resulted in higher com-
posite prices returned by local markets than the Boston market, even
though the latter market might have a higher Class I price.
1 See the statement regarding Order No. 27 (The New York Order) by S. McLean Buclcingham,
Milk Administrator, State of Connecticut, March 1, 1940 (mimeographed).
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PRODUCERS' RESPONSE TO PRICE
Farmers respond to price in many ways. These responses can be
grouped in two categories: first, responses having to do with production,
either the amount produced, the methods of production used or the prod-
uct; and second, responses which have to do with marketing, i.e., where,
and in what form, the product is sold. While this classification is not
sharp, a useful distinction can be made between supply responses affect-
ing production and those affecting marketing.
The former group of supply responses, (those affecting production)
have received attention from many students." This is particularly true
as far as the short time responses of milk producers are concerned.
Despite the many aspects of milk producers' response to price which
remain unexplained, this study makes no attempt to investigate the field
of production responses. Instead, efforts are concentrated on marketing
responses, a phase of the subject which has received much less attention
from students.
With widespread price fixing, it is becoming more and more desir-
able to have some knowledge of the extent of price differentials and the
length of period required to influence producers to transfer from one
market to another. At the present time it is sometimes said that there is a
tendency for prices of two different markets in the same territory to ap-
proach equality, other factors being equal. But there is little evidence to
support such a statement, even when it is qualified with that convenient
phrase "in the long run."
In attempting to throw some light on this matter of producers' re-
sponse to differing prices in two markets, two areas in New Hampshire
were selected. Selection of these particular areas was carefully made.
Using the individual producer maps described in the first publication of
this series," those areas where two milksheds overlapped were located. Of
seven of these, the two in which intermingling of producers, non-inter-
ference of a local market which might offer the alternative of retail dis-
tribution, and availability of price records all seemed most propitious,
were selected.
These two were the town of Jefferson, where Boston, Mass. and
Berlin, N. H. compete for milk, and the town of Haverhill, where Boston
and Aianchester, N. H. compete for milk. The location of these areas is
indicated in figure 9. In both of these areas the competition is between
wholesale outlets, truck routes of the two markets intermingle and there
has been some shifting of producers between markets.
^For example see: , ,,^ , t^ . ,,•,1 -r. j i- • ..i.
Allen R H Hole, Erling, and Mighell, R. L.. "Supply Responses in Milk Production m the
Cabot-Marshfi'eld Area, Vermont," U. S. D. A. Tech. Bui. 709,_ 1940. ,.,.„,
Cassels, J. M., and Malenbautn, Wilfred, "Doubts About Statistical Supply Analysis, Jour,
tarm
Econ. 20, 448-461. 1938. _ ^ , „ " -r. . • .
E::ckial, Mordecai, Rauchcnstein, Emil, and Wells, O. V., "Farmers Response to Price in the
Production of Market Milk," U. S. D. A.. B. A. E. mimeograph, 1932. , ^ , „ . „ . „
Cans A R "Elasticity of Supply of Milk from Vermont Plants, I The Milk Feed-Price Ratio,
Vermont AgVi. Expt. Sta. Bui. 269, 1927. . „ • t^ ,.
Johnson S M "Elasticity of Supply of Milk from Vermont Plants, II Factors Affecting Deliver-
ies in Cabot and Marshfield, Vt., 1920-1935," Vermont Agri. Expt. Sta. Bui. 429, 1937.
Parsons M. S., "Effect of Changes in Milk and Feed Prices and m Other Factors Upon Milk
Production in New York," N. Y. (Cornell) Agri. Expt. Sta. Bui. 688, 1938.
"MacLeod, opus cit. 1937.
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In these markets, price data were obtained over as long a period as
possible, and in such detail that individual price records for each farmer
were secured. From these records, composite prices received for 3.7 per
cent milk at the farmstead were calculated. This was done to obtain the
price which actually was received by each producer at his farm, and
Fig. 9. Outline map of New Hamp-
shire SHOWING AREAS IN WHICH
MARKET COMPETITION WAS STUDIED
therefore, theoretically at least, the price to which he would react in de-
ciding whether or not to sell in a particular market.
These price records, of course, indicated when a producer shifted
markets but supplied no information about why the shift was made. In
an attempt to answer this question, all producers were interviewed and
their reasons for selling to particular markets were obtained (insofar as
they were willing and able to give them). Finally all available data were
taken into consideration in the analysis.
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THE HAVERHILL, N. H. AREA
The Boston market through a country station in the village of North
Haverhill, and the Manchester, N. H. market through a station in East
Haverhill, compete for milk in the town of Haverhill. Figure 10 shows
the situation as it existed in the spring of 1939, individual farms being rep-
resented by circles and squares. The market to which milk is sold is in-
dicated by the symbol used.
Historical
Haverhill, N. H. is situated in the Connecticut River Valley in the
western part of the state. (See figure 9 for location of the area). For a
number of years, a country station located in the village of North Haver-
hill has shipped milk to Boston and one at East Haverhill has shipped to
Manchester. By selecting an area which at some points includes small parts
MANCHESTER
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of adjacent towns while at the same time sections of Haverhill are not
included, the influence of outside markets can be largely eliminated and
the study can be confined to producers who have the two alternative
markets from which to choose.
The two country stations had been in existence for a number of
years before March, 1931, the beginning of the period under study. The
Boston station, until December, 1936, was a Grade A station and produc-
ers selling to it were in a position to obtain Grade A premiums for milk
of that quality. Aside from these premiums, producers generally enjoyed
favorable bases under a base rating system. This is indicated by the premi-
um which Boston shippers enjoyed at North Haverhill over those deliv-
ering milk to Lancaster, a premium much greater than differences in
freight rates would justify. (Appendix Tables 5 and 6).
In December 1936, a strike was called by some of the cooperatives
supplying the Boston market and many Haverhill producers diverted milk
from the North Haverhill plant to cooperative plants elsewhere. Owner-
ship of the plant changed hands early the following year and most of
these producers returned to North Haverhill. Following the change in
ownership. Grade A premiums were no longer paid and the base-rating
system was abandoned.
Shipments to Manchester from the country plant at East Haverhill
began in the twenties and have continued ever since, the plant being op-
erated by one of the largest distributors in that city. All through the peri-
od covered by the study, milk delivered to this plant was purchased on a
base and surplus system.
Conditions in the Haverhill area have remained relatively stable
throughout the period of this study. Except for a short time during the
milk strike and change in plant ownership in 1936-37, producer-dealer
relationships were good, and as shown in figure 10, shifting between
markets was infrequent.
Price Relationships Between Manchester, New Hampshire and Boston
Selection of a price basis for comparing the relative attractiveness of
two markets to the producer offers several difficulties. Illustrative of
them, is the question of whether or not association dues should be deduc-
ted. From one standpoint, a portion, at least, of such dues may be re-
garded as capital investment, later to yield a return to the producer, and
represented by a certificate of some kind. Another viewpoint would de-
duct all such dues on the grounds that insofar as present and past returns
are concerned, the actual prices received after all deductions are made, are
most significant. Similar difficulties arise all along the line.
No completely satisfactory price series can be selected for the pur-
pose of determining the prices to which producers react in selecting their
markets. Different producers pay attention to different price quotations.
Some apparently make their decisions on the basis of prices quoted for
"base" milk at the plant, others consider prices for all milk at the farm,
some deduct hauling charges and dues, some deduct neither and some,
one but not both. Often, prices quoted by producers do not refer to milk
of the same butterfat content, and faulty price comparisons may result.
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This confusion and lack of uniformity in the price quotations to
which producers pay attention, prevents the selection of any one of them
as the one to which all producers react. Instead, that price comparison
to which the producer would react, if he made his decision on the basis
of the price \\'hich would have returned him the greatest net income
at the farm (setting aside for the moment the many other factors which
must be taken into consideration) is selected.
Using this criterion, the price series used in this comparison are com-
posite prices with trucking costs and association dues deducted, expressed
on a 3.7 per cent butter fat basis; i.e., net prices on the farm. The average
prices presented are calculated by deducting typical transportation
charges from not only prices received by those who send their milk on
commercial routes, but also those who haul their own milk to the dealer's
plant. The situation on a particular farm may vary slightly from this
average but not sufficiently to nullify the comparison. Prices are calcu-
lated to a uniform butterfat content, and refer to milk of market grade.
Premiums received for Grade A milk have not been included.
This price comparison is presented in figure 11, which shows the
differential of Manchester prices over Boston prices and the percentage
of producers in the area studied, selling to Manchester.
Manchester prices, over the whole period, have averaged 4.3 cents
over Boston (at the farm in Haverhill). For the first half, 1931-34, Man-
chester prices were at a discount of 7.2 cents under Boston, while in the
years 1935-38, they averaged 15.9 cents premium over Boston. (These
statements, along with others in this and the following sections, refer to
M'hat might be termed the general level of prices and do not imply that
there have not been short periods during which price relationships have
been reversed.)
Until 1936, both markets purchased milk on a base-rating plan, but
following December of that year, Boston shippers have sold on a com-
posite or flat price basis.
Factors Other Than Price Which hifliiejiced Haverhill Producers
in Their Choice of a Market
In attempting to learn the reason why producers sold in the markets
in which they did, much was discovered regarding the factors other than
price which operate in an area to influence market outlet.
First, and most important, is that producers are seldom free to shift
from one market to another at their own convenience. Many handlers
limit the number of producers or the amount of milk which they will
purchase, and even though producers may wish to sell to them, no means
of "getting into the market" exists. Another way in which free move-
ment of producers may be limited, is through existing contracts with the
present sales agency which prevent release of a producer to another mar-
ket except after a certain length of time.
Another deterrent to the shifting of markets is the use of a base-
rating system or some similar device, whereby a new producer has to
take, for a time, a lower price than do regular producers.
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Producers sometimes are influenced in their choice of markets by the
manner in ^\hich prices are quoted. Different methods of payment and
price quoting may make it difficult for producers to compare prices with
any degree of accuracy.
PERCENT]
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Still other factors tending to prevent easy transfer of producers from
one market to another are those associated with personal likes and dis-
likes. Loyalties built up between producer and dealer or producer and
hauler may require large price differences to be broken down. Likewise,
strong dislikes may prevent producers from supplying a particular hand-
ler. In this connection might be included the suspicion on the part of pro-
ducers that certain handlers misuse the rating system or report false but-
terfat percentages or, in one ^^ay or another, continue to defraud their
producers of a part of the milk price. While the most of such suspicions
may be entirely unfounded, this does not prevent their being a potent in-
fluence in determining to what handler milk is sold.
Health regulations are often an important factor in preventing easy
movement of producers from one market to another. Equipment require-
ments are apt to differ and expense be involved in qualifying to ship to a
new market.
The importance in the Haverhill area of these factors affecting pro-
ducers' market responses varied. Base-ratings, limitations by handlers on
taking on new producers, contracts to deliver to a particular plant and
other such deterrents to easy movement between markets have been im-
portant influnces in Haverhill. Another factor which undoubtedly has had
an effect has been the availability of a market for Grade A milk at North
Haverhill. Where producers could comply with requirements, the addi-
tional potential return from shipping to that station greatly afl^ected pro-
ducers' selection of a market.
As mentioned earlier, many of the Haverhill producers shipping to
the Boston market possessed unusually satisfactory base-ratings, which
they were reluctant to lose. This factor, while it endured only to the end
of 1936, was undoubtedly a strong influence against leaving the Boston
market during the first two thirds of the period studied. On the other
hand, the opportunity to obtain immediately such base-ratings was not
open to producers leaving the Manchester market; the securing of a sat-
isfactory base-rating only followed continuous delivery for some time.
Difference in the method of price quotation, sometimes an obstacle
to comparison of prices offered a producer by different market outlets,
vv as not an important factor in Haverhill. While during the latter part of
the period studied, the Manchester market purchased on a base and sur-
plus basis and the Boston market on a composite basis, prices quoted were
on a per hundredweight scale and butterfat differentials Mere the same or
similar.
Such factors as personal hkes and dislikes have been important in
Haverhill, as they are in almost all markets.
Two factors M'hich are sometimes important did not have much
prominence in Haverhill. These are (1) a difference in markets with re-
gard to the handler accepting all of a producer's milk even in the flush
season, and (2) a difference in the producer's estimate of handler's finan-
cial strength. Neither of these two factors ^^'as mentioned by producers
in Haverhill as influencing their choice of market.
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Information on the enforcement of sanitary regulations is difficult
to obtain but studies made about 1937' indicated that Boston require-
ments did not differ greatly from those of Manchester, and that enforce-
ment policies were similar.
Alarket Responses of Producers in Haverhill, New Hmnpshire
The problem of determining producers' market response to price is
vastly complicated by two sets of circumstances. First, many factors such
as personal likes and dislikes, confidence in financial soundness of dealers
and accuracy of weight and test of milk, and so forth, cannot be evaluated
exactly. Second, in considering the price to which producers have re-
sponded, the problem is difficult enough when the prices paid are prices
offered to all sellers, but when these prices are restricted to certain pro-
ducers, the evaluation of producers' response becomes very complex
indeed.
Both these sets of circumstances have been important in Haverhill
and are taken into account in the following analysis.
Each producer's market in the spring of 1939 is shown in figure 10.
This shows the manner in which the two milksheds intermingle, a charac-
teristic common to most parts of the state, and one dwelt upon in an
earlier report in this series. In this chart, symbols have been used in such
a way as not only to show the market to which shipment was being made
at the end of the period, but also the number of times producers have
changed from one market to the other in the eight years under study.
The most striking thing about this area is the extremely small number
ot persons who had changed markets. In general, the milksheds are divid-
ed in such a way that most producers ship, to the nearest plant, though
this is by no means true of everybody. Perhaps one reason for this situa-
tion is that a large number of producers in the area haul their own milk,
consequently distance from market has a direct influence, often lacking
when commercial truck routes charge a flat rate to all shippers.
Of a total of 102 producers, 90 did not change markets during the
period of study and eight more changed only once. Only four producers
made more than one shift. (These statements refer to shifts between the
two markets, Boston and Manchester, and do not take into account shifts
between individual handlers in the same market.)
The net change in the proportion of Haverhill producers shipping
to Aianchester is shown in figure 1 1 . The absolute level of this percentage
figure means little, as the limits of the area included are arbitrary and
changing of the area would, of course, change the percentage. The rela-
tive change in per cent is the significant thing, and over the whole period
this amounts to only three per cent or a change from 48 per cent to 51
per cent. This percentage figure has been placed on the same chart in
i"Milk Inspection in New England," Corbett, R. B., and Phucas, A. B., New England Research
Council. iy.!7.
"Laws and Regulations Governing the Production of Grade B Milk in New England, Brassier,
R. G. Jr., New England Research Council, 1938.
"Sanitary Laws and Regulations Governing the Productian and Distribution of Dairy Products for
Consumption within New Hampshire," MacLeod, Alan, New Hampshire Agricultural Experiment
Station, 1937.
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which is shown the net price advantage to Manchester shippers over Bos-
ton shippers.
No attempt at establishing a relationship between the relative advan-
tage of Manchester over Boston and the per cent of producers shipping
to Manchester in each particular month has been made. It is most unlikely
that producers who shift markets as seldom as do most milk producers
would respond to any particular month's differential and even though a
desire to change markets has been felt, the obstacles in the way of such
change may prevent for a considerable time or indefinitely, the actual
change. Also, the effects of other factors than price 'have not been eUm-
inated, and any conclusions based on correlation between the two series
under consideration, even assuming various time lags, would be logicallv
difficult to justify. However, if a price differential is continued over a
long period of time, it may have a cumulative effect on producers. Just
how long a differential must be in effect before it produces a shift, there
is no way of knowing. However, if instead of pay-periods, a comparison
of the same two series is made by yearly averages, with differing lags of
the percentage shipping to iManchester behind that of the price differen-
tial series, a positive correlation might be found.
A more likely explanation of shifts between two markets, than that
they take place in accordance with the differential price of one market
over another, allowing for some definite time lag, is that following a
I-Tice differential which has been sustained for a "sufficient" time, a re-
serve of producers is created who, given the opportunity, would shift to
the higher priced market. But institutional factors may prevent for
months, or even years, such shifts being made, though from the stand-
point of price differentials they would be desired by many producers.
This is just another way of saying, that in this particular area, mar-
kets were not all free, and producers were unable for many reasons to
respond to price differentials, even though such differentials may have
been in effect for a number of years.
Of course, other factors mentioned above, have influenced producers
to ship to particular markets. Such considerations as financial security,
methods of sale, personal loyalties, etc., have been important. To some
extent producers may have been unacquainted with price relationships
between the two markets, though it is doubtful whether sustained differ-
entials existed in this section without being apparent to most producers.
But as long as prices paid are not available freely to any seller, long con-
tmued differentials between the two markets can continue and the work-
ing of free competition to bring prices (taking into consideration other
factors of sale) into a stable competitive relationship may be indefinitely
postponed.
The net shift of producers in the Haverhill area of only 3 per cent
is in spite of the fact that in the first half of the period under study, Man-
chester prices were at a significant discount under Boston (without taking
into consideration Grade A premiums), and in the second half, Manches-
ter prices went to a large premium over Boston.
If judgments of future prices are made on the basis of past experi-
ence, the continued advantage of Boston over Manchester for 1931-35,
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\\ ould have led producers to expect higher prices from Boston and if no
other factors were taken into consideration and no obstacles to shifting
were present, a transfer of sales from Manchester to Boston would be
expected to result. And, in the last half of the period, after price relation-
ships had changed in favor of Manchester, they would be expected to
influence producers to leave Boston for Manchester.
And to a hmited extent this has taken place. At least, during 1931-35
there was no sustained change in the number of producers shipping,
whereas in 1935-39, there was a small but significant net increase in ship-
pers to Manchester. But these changes have been very small, and are
nothing like those which might be expected, had producers reacted to
prices alone.
That forces, preventing change in market outlets, must be strong is
shown, not by the small net changes throughout the period in the pro-
portion of producers shipping, but by the large numbers of farmers who
did not change their market throughout the period. This section has been
largely devoted to a discussion of these forces. They are present where-
ever producers sell milk at wholesale, though of course their importance
relative to the importance of price difl^erentials varies greatly. In Haver-
hill, their importance is great; so great, that only one out of every nine
producers has shifted between the Boston and Manchester markets in a
period of eight years, (net change from beginning to end of period was
3 per cent) even though the country plants serving these two markets
were only about 5 miles apart and the price differential between markets
was at times substantial.
THE JEFFERSON, N. H. AREA
The following discussion covers for the town of Jefferson much the
same ground gone over in the previous sections for Haverhill. Conse-
quently, many of the points elaborated upon in that section are given
much shorter treatment here. In general, the approach is similar and the
technique used identical.
The Boston market through country stations in the town of Lan-
caster, and the Berlin market through city plants in Berlin, compete for
milk in the town of Jefferson. Producers' markets in the spring of 1939
are shown in figure 12, which also shows the number of times producers
changed markets in the eight years under study.
Historical
( a ) B erlin Shippers
Some milk has gone from Jefferson to Berlin in each of the eight
years preceding March, 1939 (the period covered by this study). It is
necessary to go back some years earlier to find a time when no milk
flowed in that direction. The first entrance of Berlin dealers into the
area took place about 1920, when producers who were shipping to plants
in Lancaster were persuaded to change their market.
These shipments to Berlin were often induced by the promise of
high prices arid other attractive terms of purchase. Unfortunately for
producers, these promises were sometimes not fulfilled and many in-
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equipment satisfactory to public health authorities, this cooperative was
forced out of business in 1936 and most of its producers were taken over














Fig. 13. Prices at the farm from Boston and Berlin markets and
DIFFERENTIAL OF BeRLIN OVER BoSTON TOGETHER WITH PER-
CENTAGE OF Jefferson producers shipping to Berlin^
1 For data on which this figure is based, see Appendix Table VI.
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In June, 1935, the first New Hampshire Milk Control Board set pro-
ducer and retail prices in the Berlin market. The producer price schedule
set up was sharply above that previously in force and above the Boston
price in that area (see fig. 13). Had producers in the Jefferson area been
paid on the same monthly surplus basis as they were for the year and a
half preceding control, they would have received a net premium during
control of 69 cents per cwt. or 07ie and one-half cents per quart above
the Boston return in the same area
Actually, those producers in Jefferson who continued to ship to Ber-
lin during tiie period of control did not receive this "hypothetical price",
but received a somewhat lower return which averaged 46 cents per cwt.
or one cent per quart above the Boston return in the sa?Jie area.
This increase in producer price was more than sufficient to stimulate
Berlin dealers to look elsewhere than Jefferson for their milk, and the two
largest dealers in that market shifted nearly two-thirds of their purchases
from Jefferson to Maine, outside the New Hampshire Milk Control
Board's authority. Shortly after control ended in November, 1936, pur-
chases swung back again to New Hampshire,
The second New Hampshire Milk Control Board, in setting prices
in Berlin made no drastic changes to the existing price structure in the
market.
(b) Boston Shippers
Producers in Jefferson had been shipping to plants in Lancaster for
many years before the period considered in this study. Ownership of
plants had changed from time to time but throughout the years at least
(^ne buyer was always doing business and changes of the plant to ^\ hich
milk was delivered were few.
Considering the period under study, a single Boston plant received
milk in Lancaster until December, 1936. In that month, a strike was called
by some of the cooperatives supplying the Boston market and many Jef-
ferson producers diverted their milk from the Lancaster plant. Within
a short time of the calling of the strike, plans were made to build a co-
operative plant in Lancaster and, while actual construction was not com-
pleted for some time, from December 1936, milk was received and paid
for by the cooperative on the same basis as if a plant were in operation.
From the time the strike was called, two different composite prices
have been paid to producers shipping to Lancaster, depending upon the
organization to which the milk is delivered. For a few months, these prices
differed materially, but since August 1939, the differences have amounted
to only a few cents (an effect of the deduction of differing association
dues, etc.).
Price Relationships Between Berlin, New Hampshire, and Boston
As was the case with Haverhill, and subject to the same qualifications,
the price series used for comparison are composite prices with trucking
costs and association dues deducted, expressed on a 3.7 per cent butterfat
basis.
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This price comparison is shown in figure 13 which shows the dif-
ferential of Berlin prices over Boston prices and the percentage of pro-
ducers in the Jefferson area selling to Berlin. From December, 1936, two
scries are given for Boston, representing the prices received (after deduc-
tion of dues and transportation) at the farm for milk delivered to each
station.
Except for brief periods, Berlin prices have been consistently above
Boston prices, even after taking into consideration the higher transporta-
tion charges to plants supphing the former market. For the whole period,
a simple average for Berlin is 27.6 cents per cwt. above the price received
by producers shipping to one Boston handler and 21.1 cents over that
returned by the other Boston handler. This differential is by no means
uniform, however, reaching high levels in the period August 1931-June
1932 and August 1935-July 1937, and at times dropping to below Boston
for periods of several months duration.
If prices, alone, were considered, and if producers were free to select
the market in which to sell, the relationships of the eight years preceding
March 1939, might have been expected to result in a wholesale shift of
producers away from the Boston, and to the Berlin, market. A sustained
advantage in net returns from one market to another, other things being
etiual, should influence producers to sell in the market which yields the
greater return.
Factors Other Thmi Price Which hjfluenced Jejferso?i Producers in
Their Choice of a Market
In the corresponding section on Haverhill, a general discussion of
the factors other than price which influence producers' choice of market
v/as presented. Accordingly, in this section, it is proposed to confine the
discussion to the importance of specific factors operating in the Jefferson
aiea, and not to repeat the generalized treatment contained in the earlier
section.
The first two factors considered are: (1) that handlers may limit the
number of producers or the amount of milk \\hich they will purchase,
and (2) that existing contracts may prevent immediate release of pro-
ducers from their present sales agencies.
Both of these obstacles to free producer movement were of impor-
tance in Jefferson. Particularly in the latter part of 1935, when Control
Board action raised Berlin prices to their highest differential over Boston
prices, Berlin dealers, instead of taking on more producers, dropped old
shippers and procured a part of their milk in Maine. At other times, often
M'hen the Berlin market was most attractive, dealers in that market had all
the milk they required and would-be-sellers were unable to enter the
market.
Especially since 1937, when producers organized to build their own
cooperative plant in Lancaster, a retarding influence on shifts to the Berlin
market have been the contracts ^\ hich ^\ ere made with the cooperative.
These contracts obligated the signer to send his milk to the cooperative
for a definite period of years, after which he could make arrangements to
sell elsewhere if he so desired.
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Another factor tending to deter the shifting of markets is the use of
a base rating system or some similar device, whereby a new producer has
to take, for a time, a lo\\'er price than do regular producers. In Jefferson,
after December 1936, producers selling to Boston were no longer paid on
a base rating plan. Berlin producers, on the other hand, have received
payment according to base rating plans throughout the period covered by
this study; such plans, however, often assigning bases according to no
very definite rule. Following the abandonment of the base rating system
in the Boston market, a provision in the Federal Order required new pro-
ducers in that market to accept Class II prices for the two months im-
mediately following their entry into the market.
Different methods of payment and price quoting make it difficult
for producers to compare prices. It is entirely probable that many pro-
ducers in Jefferson were not aware whether the price which they received
for milk in a particular month ^^as higher or lower than that received by
a neighbor for milk of comparable quality, because of the different
methods of quoting prices. Berlin prices were usually quoted on a quart
basis, Boston on a hundredweight. When to this difference were added
different base-rating systems and butterfat differentials, the difficulty of
comparison became great.
The factors associated with personal likes and dislikes have had an
important influence in the Jefferson area. Loyalties between producer and
handler were in many cases very strong. Likewise, strong dislikes have
prevented producers from supplying particular handlers. Producers' suspi-
cions (even though they may have been entirely unfounded) that rating
systems \\-ere misused, false butterfat tests reported, or other unfair prac-
tices carried on, have been influential in determining to what handler milk
was sold.
While evidence on the enforcement of sanitary regulation was diffi-
cult to obtain, studies made in 1937' indicated that Boston requirements
were somewhat more rigorous than those of Berlin and were probably
more stringently enforced, the Berlin health department being handi-
capped by small funds. Farmers who were questioned on the relative dif-
ficulty of satisfying the requirements of both markets, while not unani-
mous, generally believed that it was ^easier to qualify to ship to Berlin
than to Boston, but that the difference was not great.
Particularly in the latter part of the period studied, an important
fnctor to be considered was that producers selling to Boston had assurance
that all of their milk would be accepted and paid for at the prevailing
price. Those selling to Berlin, on the other hand, had in addition to a base
rating system which required them to accept Class II price for all milk
delivered above a certain quantity, no assurance that they might not be
asked to keep at home a portion of their production.
Another factor in ^hich the markets differed was in the reputation
of their dealers for financial strength. A common observation, undoubt-
edly engendered by the past experience of certain producers who had
^Corbett, et al, opus cit.
Bressler, opus cit.
MacLeod, opus cit.
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been left with substantial sums owing them by Berlin dealers who were
financially weak, was that in selling to those handlers who supplied the
Boston market, they were "sure of their money." Even though the losses
incurred in selling to Berlin had been suffered some years past and the
dealers responsible no longer purchased milk in the area, the feeling still
persisted that payment was less sure in the Berlin market.
Market Response of Producers i?i Jefferson
This section should be read keeping in mind the more general dis-
cussion of the earlier section on Haverhill.' In that earlier section many
of the considerations affecting producers' market response were consid-
ered at some length and material presented there is not repeated here.
In the absence of other market factors, price differentials such as
those which existed between the Berlin and Boston market in Jefferson,
would be expected to cause a shift of producers from the lower to the
higher priced market.
Figure 12 shows each producer's market in the spring of 1939, and
the number of times producers changed from one market to the other in
the preceding eight years.
Figure 12 also shows that in a general way, the closer producers live
to Lancaster, the more tendency there is for them to ship to that market,
and likewise, though to a much less extent, the reverse holds true on the
side nearest Berlin. This is to be expected, to the extent that hauling
charges vary with distance, and in Lancaster this tendncy persists.^ In
Berlin, however, charges are the same, regardless of distance from market.
Perhaps the most noteworthy thing brought out by figure 12 is that
the major part of the producers in the area made no shift in market
throughout the period. More than one-half of those who did change,
shifted only once and only one producer made as many as four changes
or an average of one every two years.
In an effort to see whether producers who changed markets differed
from those who remained constant throughout the period, the average
qauntity of milk delivered per month for each group was calculated.
(Table VII). No significant relationship is apparent between the amount
Table VII. Avfc:RAGE Quantity of Milk Delivered by Producers
IN Jefferson Area (1931 - 39)^ Quantity per month
(pounds)





^ Includes 5.) producers.
- Does not include one farmer with very large production.
of production and the tendency to change markets. Other characteristics
of producers which might distinguish between those who remained with
one market throughout the period studied and those who changed were
^ See page 30.
^ See MacLeod and Geraglity, opus. cit. p. 23.
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not readily apparent, and it seems likely that if any differences exist they
are largely psychological differences, some producers being more prone
to try new markets than others.
The net change in the proportion of Jeft'erson producers shipping
milk to Berlin, has been shown in figure 13. As in the case of Haverhill,
the absolute figures are unimportant, being dependent upon the arbitrary
limits selected for the area, but the relative change is significant. Contrary
to Haverhill, a net change over the whole period of 11 per cent or a
change from 19 per cent to 30 per cent was observed.
No attempt has been made to establish a relationship between the
relative advantage of Berlin over Boston and the per cent of producers
shipping to Berlin in a particular month. Milk producers shift markets
so seldom that it is unlikely that they would respond to the differential of
a particular month. Nor have the effects of other factors than price been
eliminated.
However, it may be that a price differential continued over a long
period of time may have a cumulative effect on producers, and there
seems no doubt but that over the eight years, the sustained net price ad-
vantage for Berlin has brought about the shift to that market.
This study has not answered the question of how long a differential
must be in effect before it produces a shift. Presumably the bigger the
differential, the shorter is the period that is required. While a comparison
of the two series by yearly averages, with differing time lags, might be
made to yield a positive correlation, such a correlation may be largely a
mathematical accident, because, to use one example, in 1935-36, when the
price differential was high, new producers were not taken on by the Ber-
lin market, and a number of old producers were dropped.
Another, and more probable explanation of shifts between markets'
is that following a price differential which has been sustained for some
time, a reserve of producers is created who, given the chance, will shift
to the market with the higher price. Institutional factors, however, may
retard or even prevent such adjustments to price being made. Other
factors than price must not be lost sight of, as they have influenced pro-
ducers to ship to particular markets. Consideration such as financial se-
curity, methods of sale, personal loyalties, etc., have been important.
However, in spite of many of the factors other than price working
in the direction of influencing producers away from the Berlin market,
the percentage of producers selling to Berlin has increased from 19 to 30.
This indicates the importance of price differentials in determining the
channels through which milk flows to market.
Difficidties of Price Fixing by a State Agency in a Market Near a
State Line
Before leaving the consideration of the Jefferson area, a part of the
period under review can be made to yield information of value to control
agencies, as well as to shed light on the effect of prices on milk supply.
1 See page 3L
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During the years 1934 - 37, some 31 producer-distributors and 16
dealers supplied the city of Berlin (population approximately 20,000)
with milk and cream. A little over one-third of the milk \vas handled by
producer-distributors and nearly two-thirds by dealers buying all, or
most, of their milk from producers. Practically all of the producer-dis-
tributors lived to the north ^^•ithin a few miles of the city. In addition,
most of the small dealers secured the bulk of their milk from this same
section of the milkshed. The larger dealers, however, who supply about
one-third of the market had to go farther afield for most of their supplies.
The normal area of supply for the large dealers had for some years
before the advent of the Milk Control Board been in the town of Jeffer-
son, distant by road about 21 miles.
To complete the picture of the Berlin market, it must be kept in
mind that milk is available some 40 miles away in the state of Maine.
Normally, this milk moves southeast to Auburn, but price relationships
can become such that it will enter the Berlin market.
The first New Hampshire Milk Control Board had emergency pow-
ers to set producer and resale minimum prices. On June 15, 1935, it availed
itself of those powers and set the following price schedule in Berlin:
"Milk, retail in quart bottles— 11 cents. Dealers to pay producers six cents
per quart or |2.78 per cwt. for milk delivered at their plant and sold as
fluid milk with a butterfat differential as set by the Boston Market Ad-
ministrator. Surplus to be paid for at prices estabHshed by the Boston
Market Administrator." Prior to the control board action. Class I milk
had been paid for on the basis of $2.33 per cwt. ($2 per 40 quarts).
Prices paid by Berlin dealers to producers in Jefferson throughout
the three years immediately preceding control averaged only 10 cents
above the Boston prices in the same area.
The producer price schedule set up by the Control Board resulted in
prices above those previously in force and also above the Boston price in
the Jefferson area. Whereas the premium of Berlin price over Boston
price (composite, at the farm in Jefferson with trucking charges de-
ducted) for the year preceding control had averaged only seven cents
per cwt., immediately after control the differential became very wide.
Had producers in the Jefferson area been paid on the same monthly
surplus basis as they were for the year and a half preceding control, they
v/ould have received a net premium during control of 69 cents per cwt.
or one mid one-halj cents per quart above the Boston retiirji in the same
area.
Prices set by a control agency are not only prices within an area at
which producers may sell but also they are prices below which the dis-
tributor cannot buy. In most New Hampshire markets this distinction is
meaningless as there is no alternative market, or markets, in which the
distributor may buy—all are under the control of the agency or else are
so distant that transportation expenses are too great to make them eco-
nomically practicable. This is not so of Berlin. Within 45 miles milk is
available in a market m hich, so far as the first New Hampshire Milk Con-
trol Board was concerned, was not under control. In other words, the
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West Paris, Maine, area was a free market so far as the Berlin distributor
was concerned, no minimum price below which he could not buy being
in existence.
When this is the case, it is difficult to raise prices in a particular mar-
ket beyond the point where milk purchased in that area becomes more
expensive to the dealer than that which he can obtain in an uncontrolled
market.
Normally, the net composite price in the West Paris, Maine, area
received by producers selling to the Boston market, averages five cents
per cwt. over that received by similar producers in Jefferson. In addition
to this, transportation charges from West Paris to Berlin averaged six cents
per cwt. over those from Jefferson to Berlin. Therefore, in order to pro-
cure milk from Maine, a dealer ordinarily would have to pay 11 cents
per cwt. or approximately one-fourth of a cent per quart more at the
plant in Berlin than he had been paying in Jefferson, and to the extent of
this difference, a control agency could raise the net price to be paid in
Jefferson without providing any price incentive for dealers to shift to
Alaine for their milk supply.
But the increase in price from $2.33 to $2.79 per cwt. for Class I milk
at the city plant was more than sufficient to stimulate Berlin dealers to
look elsewhere than Jefferson for their milk. It has been noted above,
that anything over an 11 or 12 cent per cwt. increase in controlled New
Hampshire markets would put the uncontrolled Maine markets in a favor-
able position, assuming, of course, that dealers and producers could shift
from one market to another without trouble or expense. As a mattei* of
fact the trouble and expense involved in such a shift are considerable and
v/ithout sizable savings no shift is likely to be made.
In Berlin, potential savings were so large that the shift was made by
the two largest dealers selling in that market. These dealers, selling be-
tween them some 2000 quarts daily in Berlin, shifted about two-thirds of
their purchases from Jefferson to Maine when the Control Board came
into the market. Shortly after control ended they were once more pur-
chasing practically all of their milk in New Hampshire.' This supply of
milk amounted to nearly one-half the milk purchased by dealers and
about 30 per cent of all milk distributed in the city.
Other Bedin dealers made only small shifts in source of supply,
though some stated that had the Control Board kept the same policy in
operation they would have been forced to shift more of their purchases
from New Hampshire into Maine.
This shift from New Hampshire to Aiaine sources of supply was not
made without difficulty. The cooperative organization which was active
in the Aiaine area opposed shift of producers away from their regular
market.
A factor which made it easier for dealers to enter the Maine area was
the establishment of a trucking service from Maine points. This service,
\\ hich operated only during the period in which Berlin milk was under
^Prices offered at Auburn, Me., followed closely those of the higher Lancaster series, (see figure 13).
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control, operated for approximately 29 cents per hundredweight as com-
pared with 23 cents per hundredvv^eight trucking charge on milk from
Jefferson,
This movement of dealers away from Jefferson left a number of the
producers in that area without a market and protests were made to the
Control Board. Without authority to enforce minimum prices in Maine
the Board was powerless to force dealers to continue buying milk from
Jefferson producers. It did, however make certain price concessions to
attract dealers to buy milk from that area. These efforts were not very
effective but probably did prevent Berlin dealers from dropping a still
greater number of their Jefferson producers.
On balance, producers in Jefferson were hurt, rather than helped,
by Control Board activities during this period. While a handful may have
received better markets because of the price schedules set up by the
Board, many of them lost their markets entirely.
This incident demonstrated that a state control agency cannot set
producer prices within the state appreciably above those at which milk
can be obtained from an area outside its jurisdiction, without having a
shift away from the controlled area into the uncontrolled, with resultant
loss of market to producers within the state,
CONCLUSIONS REGARDING PRODUCERS'
MARKET RESPONSES TO PRICE
While only two areas where markets compete for milk have been
studied in detail, these two were carefully selected and the effects of
certain factors upon producers were found to be similar. Accordingly,
it is possible to generalize from the conclusions obtained in the study of
these two areas to other areas of the Northeast.
A differential in prices of one competing market over another, will,
if continued for a considerable length of time (several years) arouse a
desire on the part of some of the producers in the lo^\'er priced market
to shift to the higher priced market. Factors other than price, however,
may be sufficiently potent to delay, or offset, or even reverse the action
initiated by the price differential. For example, prices received by pro-
ducers shipping to a particular market often are not available to new pro-
ducers. In fact, frequently, producers wishing to begin shipments to a
market may be unable to receive any price—the buyer may have sufficient
milk and may refuse (or be unable) to accept additional quantities.
To the extent to which buyers are capable of exercising absolute
control over the amount of milk they purchase, price differentials be-
tween markets are of secondary importance. This is especially true where
control agencies set, and enforce, minimum prices for Class I and Class II
milk, and consequently prevent price competition between handlers for
milk going into a particular use. Composite prices within the market may
still differ but with control over class prices, handlers may, by regulating
their purchases of Class II milk, exercise great influence over the com-
posite price which they pay.
Conditions of sale such as these are far from those usually though of
as "free competition," Producers are not able to sell an unlimited quantity
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of their product by offering it at a price slightly below the prevailing
market. Nor are buyers able to secure large additional quantities by offer-
ing prices slightly above the market. Prices are what has been termed
"administered," that is, they are set by governmental agencies, and are
usually neither those that would be arrived at under conditions of free
competition, nor those which a monopoHst would set in order to obtain
maximum revenue.
The control over class prices paid producers who sell to a market in
v»hich a control agency operates is usually complete, though individual
handlers (except where there is a market-wide pool) may influence the
composite price which they pay producers by varying their purchases
and sales of milk. There is not the same control over either the amount of
milk or the number of producers which a plant may receive. The indi-
vidual handler can, apart from the influence of price, exert a great pres-
sure in keeping producers from shipping to his plant, but can do very
little in the direction of attracting them. Consequently, restrictions on the
entry of a producer into the market become effective only when price
and other factors attract producers. When the opposite situation is true,
a handler's policy of exclusion is no longer an important influence.
Other important factors which exert an influence over producers'
selection of a market might be grouped under price. These include such
items as, promptness of payment, methods of payment, financial respon-
sibility of the handler, reliability of weights and tests, and so forth. As
was seen in the case of the Berlin market, past experience of financial loss
were given considerable weight in selection of a market.
Still other factors are those having to do with sanitary laws and regu-
hnions. In recent years, various markets have set up standards for milk
vv hich must be met before a producer is permitted to supply milk to that
market. Sometimes the requirements of one market are sufficiently dif-
ferent from those of the alternative market to involve trouble and expense
in compliance.
Extremely difficult of evaluation are those important factors which
are included under personal likes and dislikes. Where dealings with a
buyer are continuous as they are in the case of a milk producer making
daily deliveries, the importance of these personal factors is much greater
than when sales occur only a few times a year. l>oyalties, reputations for
fair dealing, and dislikes often outweigh large price differences in the
minds of producers.
Whatever the region, the decision of producers to sell to this market
or that is based upon a great many considerations besides price. The
weight given to each factor undoubtedly differs between producers, and
tne difficulty of isolating the influence of one particular factor is great.
It has been possible, however, to examine separately each of these factors
and to determine the direction in which it operates and to some degree
its relative importance. By examining a particular area with the object of
finding the factors M'hich are present, together with something of their
importance, an estimate can be made of the market response of producers
to a long continued price differential between alternative markets. Such
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an estimate cannot be reduced to refined quantitative terms, but it can be
expressed within broad limits, such as "little or no shifting," "slight shift-
ing," "considerable shifting," "much shifting,"
These terms are unsatisfactory, but with so many of the factors im-
possible to evaluate mathematical!)', or to segregate or keep constant, no
object would be served by attempting to use correlation analysis or by
attempting to express the results in precise mathematical terms.
PRICES AND PRICE DIFFERENTIALS ON THE SUPPLY SIDE
OF NEW HAMPSHIRE MILK MARKETS
In this study, prices received on the farm and prices paid at the
dealer's plant have been under consideration. Earlier studies have ana-
lyzed the cost of country hauling which represents the major part of the
differential between farm and plant prices.
This series of studies has not attempted to collect and publish price
data. Not what prices are, but what makes them what they are and how
they affect producers, are of primary concern. The studies of milk
transportation yielded a method of reorganizing truck routes and market
areas in such a way as to reduce charges and showed that present bases of
charges are often indefensible and frequently include monopoly elements.
This final study of the series, after sketching briefly the historical
background of milk prices in New Hampshire, shows how in a typical
market, prices are not arrived at through any scientific basis, and, as in
milk trucking, are certainly not those prices which perfectly competitive
conditions would bring about. And yet these markets do not appear to be
at all unstable. Apparently, it is normal for producers in New Hampshire
markets to receive differing prices for the same quality milk, produced
the same distance from market. Some of those differences may be explic-
able on the basis of differing seasonality of production, but most of them
seem to have no place under condition of perfect competition. Here, as
in so many other phases of the milk marketing process, those factors
which may be included under the term monopolistic as applied to a par-
ticular handler, together with those having to do with personal relation-
ships (to some extent these may be included under monopoly elements)
are important.
When markets throughout the state are considered, prices are found
to vary much more wideh' than any differences in transportation costs
would justify. Here, it appears that prices have not been determined by
competitive forces or by conditions of varying degrees of monopoly, but
by a third set of conditions, namely, the action of administrative bodies.
This is not completely true. Prices are set for milk going into t\\ o classifi-
cations; Class I and Class II, but the decisions as to the amount of milk
going into each of these classes are made by the handler and the producer,
and composite prices are a resultant of administered prices, handlers de-
cisions as to the amount of Class II milk which they purchase, and the
producers' decisions as to the amount of milk they offer for sale.
Apparently this condition of varying prices between markets with
little reference to transportation costs or other economic factors, is not
noticeably unstable. Such price relationships can exist for some time with-
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out producing shifts of production from the low priced market to the
high priced. Here again the explanation is not that the higher priced
market is not attractive to producers, but that producers are unable to
enter that market because there is no handler in the market who wishes
to purchase milk from them.
At this point, it is necessary to touch on a matter that is outside the
field of this study, but which has, where administered prices prevail, an
important bearing on producer prices in a market. Handlers are primarily
interested in disposing of milk in the forms in which it returns the largest
net profits, which may not be those which bring the highest price to pro-
ducers. "If certain class prices in federal and state orders are not well ad-
justed in relation to the prices whether retail or wholesale, at which milk
can be sold in the various channels, distributors can be expected to divert
supplies into those classes or channels offering unusual opportunities for
profit. For this reason all of the class prices as well as the various adjust-
ments and differentials applying to them, need to be reasonably well
adjusted, not only to the prices prevaihng for alternative sources of sup-
ply, but also with respect to the ultimate prices at which the various milk
products can be sold. This is especially important where retail prices,
based upon previously prevailing competitive relationships, are established
by public regulation."^
These considerations throw light on the relative stability of what
appear to be unstable price relationships, both between handlers in a par-
ticular market and between markets. Price schedules ordered by the New
Hampshire Milk Control Board have tended to follow closer to those
schedules previously operating in the markets than to a definite relation-
ship to distance from the primary market, Boston. To the extent that
prices and price spreads prior to milk control were such that handlers
restricted purchases to certain classes and market outlets, control measures
continued that situation. As a resultant of; (1) the price provisions of
control agencies (both state and federal), and (2) plant facilities and
markets, local New Hampshire markets handle relatively small quantities
of Class II or surplus milk, while Boston distributors purchase large
amounts. Consequently, producers ordinarily find it much easier to enter
the Boston market than most local secondary markets: the fundamental
reason being that the handler in the Boston market finds it more profitable
to purchase Class II milk (above a certain minimum) than does the hand-
ler in the secondary market.
The latter part of this study investigates the market response of pro-
ducers in two areas, to varying prices for milk. As might be inferred
from earlier findings that both prices in a particular market and prices
between markets could differ widely, without apparently causing un-
stable market conditions with producers constantly shifting from low to
high priced outlets, the response of producers to large price differentials
tended to be either retarded or overshadowed by the action of other fac-
tors. In any case response to price differentials is slow and appears to man-
ifest itself by the creation of a desire to change markets, if and when
iHammerberg, D. O., Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the New England Research Council
on Marketing and Food Supply, p. 32, 1940.
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other factors involved in making the shift are favorable. The "trigger"
which sets off the reaction, appears to be controlled often by the handler
who decides when he wants to add or drop producers. Provided there has
been built up a desire on the part of producers to shift from the lower to
the higher priced market, the handler offering the higher price may in-
fluence producers to shift on short notice. However, in the absence of this
underlying desire to shift, the handler's decision to add producers is likely
to have little effect. The decision to drop producers is, of course, entirely
in the hands of the handler and his decision to do so, results in a shift in
market outlet regardless of price relationships and the resultant desires of
producers.
Occasionally, producers either through cooperative action or indi-
vidually retain the initiative in deciding where to sell. By finding alterna-
tive outlets either through existing channels or through erection or pur-
chase of cooperative plants, or through marketing direct to consumers as
producer distributors, producers may take the initiative in selecting their
markets. This course sometimes involves the calling of milk strikes and
sometimes results in duplication of plant and distribution facilities.
This study, together with the three preceding it, has been confined
to the supply side of New Hampshire milk markets. Throughout this seg-
ment of the marketing of an agricultural commodity, the operation of
what are termed the forces of free competition has been hard to find, and
where discerned, has been so overshadowed by the influence of various
institutional and monopolistic factors as to be of only secondary impor-
tance. Unfortunately, the institutional and monopolistic factors have not
always worked in the direction of marketing efficiency. Over-capacity,
duplication of equipment and wasted effort are all too commonly found
in milk collection and assembly. Pricing mechanisms fail to reflect under-
lying conditions of supply and demand, not only of dairy products, but
such items as transportation for milk, weighing and testing of milk and
other cost items in milk assembly.
In its present form, elements of monopoly are too numerous to per-
mit the free working of competitive factors, and monoply has not pro-
ceeded to the point where it can introduce many efficiencies of operation.
PubHc control of prices has adopted (with only minor modification)
price levels and differentials previously present in the market, and has not
succeeded in bringing about economies of assembly. The operation of
competitive forces has been overshadowed by these other two sets of
price making forces and at the time these studies A\'ere made, the effects
have not been happy.
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Appendix Table I. Prices Received by Producers in the Nashua Area
AT THE Farm, March 1939
Price No. Receiving Price No. Receiving
2.948
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Appendix Table IV. Relative Prices Paid at Plant for Z!1% Milk Sold to
Three Markets (Base: March 1, 1931-February 28, 1939)
Date
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Appendix Table IV {continued)
50 New Hampshire
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Appendix Table IV (continued)
Date
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Appendix Table V. Prices Received at the Farm from the Boston and Man-
chester Markets and Differential of Manchester over Boston, together with
Percentage of Haverhill (n.h.) Producers Shipping to Manchester
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Appendix Table V (^
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Boston Differential of Man- Percentage
dollars Chester over Boston to
per cwt. dollars per cwt. Manchester
1937
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Appendix Table V (continued)
Date
June, 1941] Local Structure of Milk Prices 57
Appendix T
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Appendix Table VI (continued)
Date
Jan.
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Boston Berlin over Boston
dollars per cwt. dollars per cwt.
Sta. A. Sta. B. Sta. A. Sta. B
Percentage
to Berlin
1936
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